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Human Linguisticality and the
Building Blocks of Languages
Martin Haspelmath1,2*
1 Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Jena, Germany, 2 Department of British Studies, Leipzig University,
Leipzig, Germany
This paper discusses the widely held idea that the building blocks of languages (features,
categories, and architectures) are part of an innate blueprint for Human Language, and
notes that if one allows for convergent cultural evolution of grammatical structures, then
much of the motivation for it disappears. I start by observing that human linguisticality
(=the biological capacity for language) is uncontroversial, and that confusing terminology
(“language faculty,” “universal grammar”) has often clouded the substantive issues in
the past. I argue that like musicality and other biological capacities, linguisticality is
best studied in a broadly comparative perspective. Comparing languages like other
aspects of culture means that the comparisons are of the Greenbergian type, but many
linguists have presupposed that the comparisons should be done as in chemistry, with
the presupposition that the innate building blocks are also the material that individual
grammars are made of. In actual fact, the structural uniqueness of languages (in
lexicon, phonology, and morphosyntax) leads us to prefer a Greenbergian approach
to comparison, which is also more in line with the Minimalist idea that there are very few
domain-specific elements of the biological capacity for language.
Keywords: linguisticality, universal grammar, language faculty, convergent evolution, cultural evolution, natural
kind entities
INTRODUCTION
This paper makes two interrelated claims and embeds them in ongoing discussions in linguistics
and some adjacent areas:
(i) Humans’ biological capacity for language (=human linguisticality) is best studied from a
broadly comparative perspective – comparing species, capacities, and languages.
(ii) The comparison of languages does not lead to immediate insights about human
linguisticality, because languages have a very diverse range of building blocks whose
similarities do not appear to be rooted in innate natural kinds.
That biolinguistics (=the study of the biological capacity for language) should adopt a broadly
comparative perspective seems such an evident suggestion that it need not be mentioned, but
de facto, the term “biolinguistics” has come to be associated with the ideas of a single scholar,
Chomsky1, and much work in the Chomskyan tradition does not take a broadly comparative
perspective. The vast majority of linguists working in the generative-grammar tradition consider
1For example, the “Biolinguistics Manifesto” (Boeckx and Grohmann, 2007) mentions Chomsky’s name in the first line, and
seven times in the first paragraph (see also Di Sciullo and Aguero-Bautista, 2016, where biolinguistics is likewise closely linked
to the Chomskyan approach, as well as Martins and Boeckx, 2016a,b: §2.6). Since Chomsky’s ideas are highly contentious and
polarizing, many linguists will not want to be associated with the term biolinguistics, even though it is in principle neutral and
transparent (like biomusicology, bioacoustics, biomechanics, etc.).
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only humans, only the capacity for language, and in addition, like
most other linguists, they tend to focus on a single language.
Still, linguists who work on a single language tend to
emphasize the broad implications of their work. In a recent
introductory textbook on syntax, for example, the authors write
that linguists are motivated by “the desire to understand the
human brain.” (Koeneman and Zeijlstra, 2017: 3), even though
their textbook talks almost exclusively about English syntax.
Thus, here I emphasize the diversity of languages, and I note
that their comparison is not at all straightforward. We cannot
simply use the building blocks as established on the basis of Latin,
English, or Chinese, and carry them over to all other languages.
And even if we compare many different languages, it is not clear
if our results contribute to “understanding the human brain” or
other aspects of human biology.
This point is often underappreciated, even by many linguists
who work on diverse languages. I conclude that biolinguistics
must become much broader if it wants to go beyond speculation
and gain lasting insights into the biological foundations
of human language.
In the next section, I explain why I use the new term
“linguisticality” for the human capacity for language, and how
it relates to other widely used terms (“faculty of language,”
“universal grammar”). Then I elaborate on the need for a broadly
comparative perspective, before coming to the central point, the




Linguisticality is the set of capacities that allows humans to
learn and use languages in all their diverse forms (spoken,
signed, written, vernacular, whispered, sacred, in song lyrics, in
proverbs, in language games, and so on). Since linguisticality
is a species-specific capacity and is invariant across the
entire human population, it is appropriately studied from a
biological perspective (in what might be called biolinguistic
inquiry; but see n. 1).
The term linguisticality, introduced in this paper, was formed
on the analogy of the term musicality2, which is used by
musicologists to refer to the human capacity for music. For
example, Honing (2018) says (see also Trehub, 2003):
“Over the years, it has become clear that all humans share a
predisposition for music, just like we have for language. all
humans, not just highly trained individuals, share a predisposition
2The analogy is music/musical/musicality = language/linguistic/linguisticality. To
be sure, the term musical not only means “music-related” (just as linguistic
means “language-related”), but also “capable of making/enjoying music,” whereas
linguistic does not have this sense (presumably because every human is “linguistic”;
though infants are often called prelinguistic). The term linguisticality is thus
not completely transparent. (It should be noted here that “linguistic” is also
sometimes used as an adjective for linguistics, the discipline of language study.
Linguisticality should of course be understood in the first sense. Thus, in a language
like German, which distinguishes between sprachlich “language-related” and
linguistisch “linguistics-related,” the counterpart of linguisticality is Sprachlichkeit.)
for music in the form of musicality – defined as a spontaneously
developing set of traits based on and constrained by our cognitive
abilities and their underlying biology.”
It may seem strange to propose a completely new term,
linguisticality, for such a basic phenomenon, after hundreds of
years of language study. And of course, many scholars have talked
about linguisticality, but there is no other single term that could
be used to make it clear exactly what is meant. Some authors
talk about the “capacity for language” (as I did in (i) above), or
the “language capacity” (e.g., Jackendoff, 1999), and these are
certainly good alternative terms.
But many others simply use “language,” and this word is
too vague. “Language” can refer to particular languages (sets of
conventions used by particular speech communities), or to the
use of a language in speech, or to the entire domain of phenomena
related to language use and language systems. As an example
of this vagueness, consider the expression “language evolution”:
This can refer to the (biological) evolution of linguisticality, or
to the (cultural) evolution (or diachronic change) of particular
language systems. To be on the safe side, Jackendoff (1999) talks
about “the evolution of the language capacity.” It would be clearer
to distinguish between (biological) “evolution of linguisticality”
and (cultural-diachronic) “evolution of languages”3.
The human capacity for language is in many ways like
an instinct, and Pinker (1994) used “language instinct” as a
book title. But much more common is another term: “language
faculty.” This term seems to go back to Saussure’s (1916)
faculté du langage, but nowadays, it is often used in a much
narrower sense. While Rizzi (2004) continues the Saussurean
tradition and uses it in the same sense as linguisticality4, many
other authors use “language faculty” (or “faculty of language”)
for a domain-specific cognitive module (sometimes called “the
language organ,” Anderson and Lightfoot, 2002)5. For example,
Chomsky et al. (2019) say at the beginning of their paper about
the language faculty:
“Generative Grammar (GG) is the study of the linguistic capacity
as a component of human cognition.”
If the language faculty is what generative grammarians study,
then it must be the hypothesized domain-specific cognitive
module, because generative grammarians do not (in practice)
study domain-general aspects of human cognition and human
3Often, such vague terminology does not do any harm because the context makes
it clear what is intended, but in this particular case, there is a serious problem –
so much so that it is unclear what is in the scope of the Journal of Language
Evolution (biological evolution, or cultural evolution, or both?). In response to a
critical blogpost of mine (https://dlc.hypotheses.org/894), the editors changed the
wording of the Aims and Scope statement, but it is still not very clear.
4“[The fundamental object of inquiry is] “the language faculty,” the “instinctive
tendency” for language, according to the terminologies used by Ferdinand de
Saussure and Charles Darwin, respectively: a cognitive capacity rooted in the
biological endowment of our species which allows us to acquire the natural
language(s) we are exposed to in childhood and use it for communication, social
interaction, and the expression of thought” (Rizzi, 2004: 323).
5Compare also the following quotation: “The faculty of language can reasonably
be regarded as a “language organ” in the sense in which scientists speak of the
visual system, or immune system, or circulatory system, as organs of the body”
(Chomsky, 2000: 4).
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auditory and articulatory abilities, which are also part of human
linguisticality. This narrow understanding of the term “language
faculty” was also used in 1978 in the famous “GLOW Manifesto”
(by Jan Koster, Henk van Riemsdijk, and Jean-Roger Vergnaud):
“It appears quite likely that the system of mechanisms and
principles put to work in the acquisition of the knowledge of
language will turn out to be a highly specific “language faculty”.”6
And non-Chomskyan authors who find the evidence for a
domain-specific module insufficient sometimes even say that they
reject the language faculty, e.g.,
“the language faculty is, quite literally, empty: natural language
emerges from general cognitive constraints, and. there is no
innately specified special-purpose cognitive machinery devoted to
language” (Christiansen and Chater, 2015: 1–2).
Christiansen and Chater do not, of course, reject the existence
of human linguisticality – they would merely say that the
human capacity for language consists of multiple different
subcapacities that are not specialized for language, at least not
for morphosyntax (they do accept that there may be a specialized
capacity for speech processing; Lieberman, 1984).
In addition to this ambiguity of the term “language faculty”
[referring to (i) linguisticality or (ii) to a hypothesized domain-
specific cognitive module], additional confusion was created by
Hauser et al. (2002), who introduced a distinction between “the
faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB)” and “the faculty
of language in the narrow sense (FLN).” The first, FLB, is the
same as linguisticality7, but the second is much less clear (“FLN is
the abstract linguistic computational system alone, independent
of the other systems with which it interacts and interfaces”).
The authors emphasize the special importance of recursion and
suggest that “FLN only includes recursion,” which would mean
that it is not domain-specific (see the discussion in Scholz et al.,
2011: §2.3). Thus, FLN cannot be the same as the hypothesized
domain-specific cognitive module (or language organ).
Finally, the term “universal grammar” (often abbreviated as
UG)8has often been used in this context by Chomskyans, but this
is not an unambiguous term either. Most commonly, linguists
use it for the set of building blocks (features, categories, and
architectures) that they hypothesize to be innate:
“Universal grammar consists of a set of atomic grammatical
categories and relations that are the building blocks of the
particular grammars of all human languages, over which syntactic
structures and constraints on those structures are defined.
A universal grammar would suggest that all languages possess the
same set of categories and relations.” (Barsky, 2016)
Chomskyan linguists rarely commit themselves to specifying
exactly which categories they assume to be innate (see
6https://glowlinguistics.org/about/history/manifesto/
7“We take as uncontroversial the existence of some biological capacity of humans
that allows us (and not, for example, chimpanzees) to readily master any human
language without explicit instruction” (Hauser et al., 2002: 1571).
8Sometimes the upper-case spelling “Universal Grammar” is used, maybe to match
the abbreviation (UG), or maybe to make it clear that this is an opaque term that
is not meant to refer to a “grammar” that is “universal.”
section “The Structural Uniqueness of the Building Blocks”)9,
but the entire enterprise is built on these assumptions,
because otherwise there would be no justification for using
different criteria for different languages (cf. Croft, 2009).
And at least for segmental features, there have been some
very concrete proposals for UG features since the 1950s
(the distinctive features of phonology, first proposed by
Jakobson, Halle, and Chomsky). Moreover, there are many
architectural proposals for the language system (e.g., the earlier
distinction between deep structure and surface structure, or
ideas about the ways in which phonology, syntax, and the
lexicon interact), which are widely thought to be due to
innate structures.
Since there is no doubt about the biological basis of human
linguisticality, it is perfectly possible that not only the instinct to
communicate, to imitate and to extract patterns from observed
speech signals is innate, but that also a substantial number
of specific structural building blocks (features, categories, and
architectures) are in place before children start hearing their
caretakers speak. The capacity for language would be like the
capacity for taste, where culture-specific taste categories (which
enable culture-specific recipes and cuisines to exist and to be
transmitted) coexist with (and have an ultimate basis in) five
innate basic taste categories (sweet, sour, salty, bitter, umami).
But in addition to this first (“innate categories”) sense
of “universal grammar,” there is also a second sense, where
UG is roughly synonymous with “domain-specific aspects
of linguisticality”:
“No known ‘general learning mechanism’ can acquire a natural
language solely on the basis of positive or negative evidence, and
the prospects for finding any such domain-independent device
seem rather dim. The difficulty of this problem leads to the
hypothesis that whatever system is responsible must be biased
or constrained in certain ways. Such constraints have historically
been termed ‘innate dispositions,’ with those underlying language
referred to as ‘universal grammar.’ Although these particular
terms have been forcibly rejected by many researchers, and the
nature of the particular constraints on human (or animal) learning
mechanisms is currently unresolved, the existence of some such
constraints cannot be seriously doubted.” (Hauser et al., 2002)
This formulation is much more careful and vague than the
earlier quote from Barsky (2016). Hauser et al. (2002) apparently
do not want to commit themselves to more specific claims
here, but they still use the term “universal grammar.” In the
above passage, they define UG as the domain-specific capacity
to acquire a language, so if one doubts the existence of domain-
specific components of linguisticality, one can say that there is a
“UG hypothesis” (e.g., Da¸browska, 2015), and that one regards
this hypothesis as “dead” (e.g., Tomasello, 2009). But there is
also a third sense of UG, where it is the same as the “(broad)
9With some exasperation, but not without justification, Tomasello observes: “Ask
yourself: what exactly is in universal grammar? Oh, you don’t know – but you
are sure that the experts (generative linguists) do. Wrong; they don’t. And not only
that, they have no method for finding out.” (Tomasello, 2009; see also text footnote
14 below on the last point).
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language faculty”10, and thus the same as linguisticality, e.g., in
this quotation:
“The term Universal Grammar (UG) is simply a label for
this striking difference in cognitive capacity between ‘us and
them’ [=humans and non-human animals]. As such, UG is the
research topic of GG: what is it, and how did it evolve in us?”
(Chomsky et al., 2019).
Since there is no doubt about the difference in cognitive
capacity between humans and non-humans, UG in this third
sense is not a hypothesis11.
Thus, we have seen that the terms “language faculty” and
“universal grammar” have been used in multiple and confusing
senses in the literature. It is therefore best to use a new term,
linguisticality, for the biological capacity for language, analogous
to the term musicality for the biological capacity for music12. The
term should not be taken as implying any further claims about
the nature of this biological capacity. This should be taken as an
empirical question.
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
LINGUISTICALITY: SPECIES,
CAPACITIES, LANGUAGES
In order to understand any biological behavioral trait or capacity
(such as birdsong, or echolocation in bats, or web-building in
spiders, or territoriality), it is important to study similarities
across different species. This is a fundamental principle in all
areas of behavioral biology, and it should of course also be
adopted in biolinguistics. Concepts specific to human languages
(such as relative clause or determiner) are unlikely to be useful
for this kind of comparison. Some linguists have taken an
interest in communicative or vocal behaviors of other animals,
but they have more often emphasized the uniqueness of human
languages (e.g., Anderson, 2004), and have not often looked
broadly across species for similarities in order to understand how
the various components of linguisticality might have arisen. What
10Hornstein (2019) basically equates them and consistently uses the term “FL/UG”.
He says: “If we call this meta-capacity [to acquire a grammar] the Faculty of
Language (FL), then humans necessarily have an FL and necessarily have UG, as
the latter is just a description of FL’s properties.” (Hornstein, 2019: 189).
11The second or third sense of the term UG is also used by Pinker (2007): “This
idea [=universal grammar] sounds more controversial than it is (or at least more
controversial than it should be) because the logic of induction mandates that
children make some assumptions about how language works in order for them
to succeed at learning a language at all. The only real controversy is what these
assumptions consist of: a blueprint for a specific kind of rule system, a set of
abstract principles, or a mechanism for finding simple patterns (which might also
be used in learning things other than language).” – As Pinker notes, the first
assumption, that what is innate is “a blueprint” (=a set of innate categories and
architectures), is indeed controversial, but this is what most generative linguists
who study languages have been assuming. And it is this “UG of innate categories,”
or “UG of natural kinds,” that I will discuss further below.
12Fitch (2015: §1) says about musicality and biomusicology: “Human MUSICALITY
refers to the set of capacities and proclivities that allows our species to generate
and enjoy music in all of its diverse forms. A core tenet of bio-musicology is that
musicality is deeply rooted in human biology, in a form that is typical of our species
and broadly shared by members of all human cultures.” The same could be said
analogously about linguisticality and biolinguistics.
Fitch (2015) says about musicality applies in exactly the same way
to the capacity for language:
“[The comparative principle] urges a biologically comparative
approach, involving the study of behavioral capacities resembling
or related to components of human musicality in a wide range of
non-human animal species. This principle is of course a question
familiar to most biologists, but remains contentious in musicology
or psychology. ‘Broad’ in this context means that we should not
limit our biological investigations to close relatives of humans
(e.g., non-human primates) but should rather investigate any
species exhibiting traits relevant to human musicality.” (Fitch,
2015: §2c)
For understandable reasons, many researchers have focused
on comparing linguisticality in humans with the capacities
of closely related species (especially chimpanzees and other
primates, but also dogs), but as Fitch (2017) notes, “our
understanding of cognitive evolution would be seriously
incomplete if we focused exclusively on comparisons of
humans with other primates (a narrow comparative approach).
Fortunately, the genomic revolution has led to a widespread
recognition of the fundamental conservatism of gene function in
very disparate species. and there is a rising awareness that distant
relatives like birds may have as much, or more, to tell us about
the biology and evolution of human traits as comparisons with
other primates.” I am not competent in this area, but it seems to
me that Fitch is right that a biologically comparative approach is
required for deeper understanding of linguisticality, just as such
an approach is needed for any other biological trait of any species.
Second, we should also compare different capacities of
humans if we want to understand each of them in a deeper
way. Most linguists who claim to be interested in language
as a cognitive capacity do not consider related capacities such
as musicality, numerical cognition (e.g., Dehaene, 1997), visual
perception. But just as we are unlikely to understand the
behavioral capacities of a single species, we are unlikely to
understand the biological bases of a single capacity in isolation.
In view of the great specialization of the research fields, there
are of course many practical impediments for such comparative
research, but we should not delude ourselves and think that
deeper insights will be possible without serious comparison
across a range of behaviors. It is natural that most linguists work
in those areas where they feel most comfortable, but the rhetoric
of some linguists suggests that they expect (or have already
reached) deep insights without any such comparison.
Third, and most importantly from my own perspective, we
need to compare different languages in a serious way. I will
elaborate on this in the next three sections, but here I will
make two general points. First, it is of course true that Western
linguists have considered different languages at least since the
17th century, when French and other European languages came
into their view in addition to Latin. But this comparison became
truly systematic and empirically serious only in the 19th century,
and in that period, the comparison was historical. Many of
the most influential philosophers and linguists of the 20th
century that considered human language in general terms (e.g.,
Chomsky, 1965; Grice, 1975; Lyons, 1977; Langacker, 1987;
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Jackendoff, 2002; Goldberg, 2006) did not base their claims on
a broadly comparative set of data. And second, within the
Chomskyan community, a strongly aprioristic approach has
always been dominant, even though since the 1990s, more and
more linguists have tried to apply the mainstream generative
grammar (MGG) formalisms to languages from outside Europe.
The general direction of research has always been to show
that languages other than English are really much like English
after all (they have DPs/determiner phrases, configurational
clause structure, standard word-class distinctions, a movement-
based treatment of alternative orders, and so on). This is
understandable, since all the textbooks are based on English, and
the textbook assumptions are the only assumptions shared by
all generative linguists. Thus, the desideratum of a biolinguistics
that would be based on a broadly comparative approach without
privileging any one language (like a biomusicology that does
not, for example, privilege Western art music; Fitch, 2015;
Honing et al., 2015) still needs to be fulfilled.
HOW P-LINGUISTIC ANALYSES MAY
ILLUMINATE LINGUISTICALITY: THE
NATURAL-KINDS PROGRAM
Instead of comparing languages in a systematic way, what the
great majority of linguists (even those who emphasize their
interest in larger questions) have been doing over the last few
decades is engage in the study of particular languages. But how
can analyses of particular languages (“p-linguistic analyses”) lead
to insights into general questions about Human Language?
In Haspelmath (2020b), I observe that p-linguistics is not
necessarily relevant to general linguistics (or “g-linguistics,” the
study of Human Language), because the properties of individual
languages are historically accidental. But there are two ways
in which the study of a single language such as Mohawk
(Baker, 1996) or French (Kayne, 1975) could contribute to our
understanding of linguisticality: (i) We can study aspects of these
languages which we know are not conventional, or (ii) we can
study the conventional grammatical rules and hypothesize that
they are based on innate building blocks (features, categories,
and architectures). The first type would include psycholinguistic
research (where speaker behavior is studied independently of
speakers’ social knowledge) and stimulus poverty considerations.
Here I will focus on the second type of study: P-linguistic
analyses that are based on the idea that all languages take their
building blocks from a common innate blueprint or “framework”
(see Haspelmath, 2010b for some discussion of this term). This
approach has been very influential, and has often been presented
as the only possibility for linguistics, even though it has always
been clear that languages can also be studied as parochial systems
of social conventions (because this is what we do when we
take a language class). Let us look at a concrete example of a
p-linguistic analysis.
Bloomfield (1933) observed that it is useful for English
grammar to posit a special Determiner category that is unknown
from Latin (and 19th century English grammar). As an
approximation, we can say that English nominals consist of four
slots, as in (1a). English Determiners include the forms in (1b).
(1)(a) Predeterminer – Determiner – Adjective – Noun
(b) the, a(n), my, your, their, this, that
If we additionally say that the first three slots may be
empty and that the two Predeterminers are all and both, we
immediately explain why we can have all of (2a–e), but not, for
example, (3a–c).
(2)(a) all the new houses
(b) both my little children
(c) that expensive dress
(d) their old article
(e) apples
(3)(a) ∗the my children
(b) ∗old the article
(c) ∗that their expensive house
P-linguistic analyses consist in setting up categories of this
kind and in specifying further conditions on the forms that can
occur in the categorial slots (e.g., the English Determiner slot can
be empty only if the noun is plural). So how could such an analysis
illuminate not only the structure of English, but the biological
capacity for language?
Bloomfield (1933) intended the Determiner category as a
language-particular category for English, but it could of course
be that it is an innate category, and that further categories such
as those in (4) are likewise part of an innate blueprint. This is in
fact what most syntacticians in the generative-grammar tradition
claim, whether explicitly or (more commonly) implicitly.
(4) verb, noun, auxiliary, verb phrase, adposition,
complementizer, case-marker, accusative, dative, ergative,
agreement-marker, finite verb, reflexive, pronoun,
coordinator, relative clause, singular, plural, first
person, second, person, tense, mood, question word,
question particle.
Clearly, the study of particular languages requires features and
categories of this kind, and it also requires larger constructions
(such as passive or causative constructions, or question-word
constructions) and relations between constructions (of the kind
that have been described by alternations or transformations).
Again, one may hypothesize that the kinds of rules that one posits
to express these regularities are part of human linguisticality from
the very beginning (that they “belong to the language faculty,” as
linguists often say).
As noted earlier, the idea that the building blocks of languages
are innate is analogous to the finding that there are basic tastes
that are genetically determined and do not vary across human
populations, and one could also point to the idea that there are
half a dozen basic emotions that are invariant and not subject to
cross-cultural variation (cf. Barrett, 2006). The building blocks of
languages would thus be natural kinds, like the building blocks of
matter – the chemical elements.
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Chemical elements are often said to be the best example of
natural kinds, but biological species and their parts are also
natural kinds in that they are given in advance by nature
and are not identified by definitions. In order to identify
gold (chemical symbol Au) or a red fox (Vulpes vulpes), we
do not make use of definitions, but of a wide variety of
symptoms (see Haspelmath, 2018 for further discussion of
natural kinds in different disciplines). That the building blocks
of languages are analogous to chemical elements has been
argued extensively by Baker (2001). When serious chemical
inquiry started in the 17th century, it was not clear whether
all parts of the world (let alone the celestial bodies) consist
of the same kinds of stuff. It was only through painstaking
study of many particular substances from different parts of
the earth (and also from meteorites, which were known to
originate from outer space) that chemists eventually came to
recognize that there are a few dozen elements of which all other
substances are composed.
Thus, it is possible in principle that the study of the
building blocks of particular languages gives us insight into the
innate building blocks because the language-particular building
blocks are actually drawn from the universal set. Determiner
would not only be a category of English, but an element of
the innate blueprint for Human Language (in other words,
part of UG in the first sense, as in the Barsky quote in
section “Human Linguisticality, the ‘Language Faculty’ and
‘Universal Grammar”’). This is what I call the natural-kinds
program for finding the innate building blocks, making use of
p-linguistic analyses.
THE STRUCTURAL UNIQUENESS OF
THE BUILDING BLOCKS
The difficulty with the natural-kinds program is that different
languages do not have the same building blocks. They show
many similarities, and for most practical purposes, it is possible
to translate from one language into another language. But there
are also many differences which cannot be reduced to a set
of elementary building blocks, at least at the present state
of our knowledge.
For example, different languages carve up the same conceptual
space in different ways, mapping to different word shapes.
Where English has just a single word hair, French distiguishes
between cheveu “head heair” and poil “beard or body or
animal hair,” and Latin made a still different subdivision
by distinguishing between capillus “heard or beard hair”
and pilus “body or animal hair” (Koch, 2001: 1146). And
where Russian distinguishes between les “forest or woods”
and derevo “wood or tree,” French has arbre for “tree”
and bois for “wood or woods or forest” (this example goes
back to Hjelmslev’s discussion in the 1930s; cf. Haspelmath,
2003: 237). Ideally, this diversity of lexical semantics would
be reduced to a small number of building blocks which
combine to yield the diversity that we actually observe. And
there is a proposal by Wierzbicka (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1996),
to explain all word meanings on the basis of about 100
elementary (and presumably innate) semantic building blocks
(“semantic primes,” or natural kinds). However, this research
program has not been adopted by the discipline because
Wierzbicka’s methodology for semantic decomposition does not
seem rigorous. It seems that most linguists regard the goal
as overambitious.
The situation is somewhat different in the case of phonological
segments, where several proposals have been made for lists of
innate building blocks that can be applied to all languages: The
“distinctive features” for segments (first proposed by Jakobson
et al., 1951 and made famous by Chomsky and Halle, 1968).
However, while there are a number of authoritative proposals
that are taught to students in textbooks (and can be looked up
in encyclopedic articles)13, these still have the status of widely
adopted proposals and do not have the status of generally
accepted discoveries. Authors such as Blevins (2004) and Mielke
(2008) have given good arguments for a different understanding
of cross-linguistic similarities in phonology, where each language
is analyzed in its own parochial terms and cross-linguistic
similarities derive from diachronic (“evolutionary”) or adaptive
tendencies. And authors like Lass (1984) and Simpson (1999)
have pointed out that comparing phoneme inventories across
hundreds of languages (as is done by Maddieson, 1984 and
others) is not possible, because a phoneme system is determined
by language-particular generalizations. Even if the distinctive
features were universal, the organization of phoneme inventories
is unique in every language. It was noted by Trubetzkoy
(1939), in the founding document of modern phonology, that
the French /t/ and the Greek /t/ are not the same element
because they occur in different contrasts in their respective
systems – they are structurally unique elements that we happen
to use the same notation for. Phonological research over the
last 80 years has not led to any different conclusions. Even
though there are many obvious similarities, each language
has its own system (and its own building blocks), and we
do not know how to reduce these systems to a set of
innate natural kinds.
In the case of syntactic building blocks, the situation is still
different from lexical semantics and phonology, but not better,
despite Baker’s (2001) suggestion that comparative syntactic
work has advanced as much as comparative chemical work in
the mid 19th century, and that our Mendeleev could just be
around the corner, providing syntacticians with a “periodic table
of innate syntactic elements” to be taught in syntax classes
and to be used in linguistic analysis. But in practice, this is
not the case. The fate of Bloomfield’s “determiner” concept is
symptomatic in this regard. In the late 1980s, it was proposed
that the “Determiner” plays a more important role in English
syntax than was previously thought, and as soon as it got
more prominent in English syntax papers, the concept was
transferred to other languages where it cannot be motivated
in the same way (on the assumption that it is not a unique
building block of English, but must reflect the innate blueprint).
For example, in Modern Greek, the definite article and the
demonstrative co-occur and thus cannot be in the same slot
13e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinctive_feature
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 January 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 3056
fpsyg-10-03056 January 31, 2020 Time: 16:9 # 7
Haspelmath Human Linguisticality and the Building Blocks of Languages
(e.g., aftó to spíti [that the house] “that house”). Different
criteria were used in different languages for a determiner,
and it was simply assumed that all languages have it, even
when it is not overt most of the time. The motivation for
assuming such an innate category came from English, not from
comparative studies14.
The general situation in syntax is different from lexical
semantics in that many syntacticians assume that there is
a fixed list of innate building blocks (whereas few lexical
semanticists assume this), but unlike phonologists, syntacticians
have not come up with an authoritative proposal. The different
“frameworks” that arose in the 1980s have proposed very different
sets of basic building blocks (e.g., Relational Grammar, Blake,
1990; Lexical-Functional Grammar, Bresnan, 2001; Mainstream
Generative Grammar; Adger, 2003), and within the numerically
dominant MGG school, there are many different views which
are often mutually incompatible. Authors like Cinque (1999)
have argued for a “cartographic” approach in which many
dozens of innate categories are proposed, but other authors,
inspired by philosophical “Minimalism,” have argued that it
is quite impossible for so many natural-kind categories to be
innate because they could not have evolved (this has been
called “Darwin’s problem”, e.g., Bolhuis et al., 2014: 5). And
finally, actually practicing language describers have not found
any use for any of these proposals. Unlike the proposals of
phonological theorists, which have sometimes been made use
of in comprehensive grammatical descriptions, the “framework-
based” proposals play no role in the training for linguistic
fieldwork (cf. Payne, 1997; Chelliah and De Reuse, 2011).
Language describers basically still follow Boas’s (1911)
exhortation to describe each language in its own terms (just
as anthropologists describe each culture as a unique set of
practices), rather than imposing some preconceived scheme
on them, even though they have realized that comparative
work can help them because of the many similarities
of languages15.
Now one may of course object to this negative assessment
by observing that our current lack of a complete theory of
innate building blocks does not mean that such a theory is
impossible. This is true, but there seems to be little awareness
among linguists who are pursuing this program that a natural-
kinds theory is not necessary, and that much of the current
research is based on the unquestioned presupposition that
there is no alternative to it. The next section will sketch such
an alternative: The idea that the cross-linguistic convergence
of linguistic features (leading to striking similarities between
languages) may be due to convergent cultural evolution, rather
than to innate natural kinds.
14Thirty years after the original proposal, many authors still work with a universal
determiner category, though many others have raised objections. As a recent
workshop on the topic NP vs. DP (at the Annual Meeting of the DGfS, Bremen,
2019) showed, there is no agreement on methodological standards for determining
whether such a universal building block exists.
15For example, Epps (2011: 648) says that fieldworkers should “produce
descriptions in formats that will enable and facilitate comparison across languages,
but also remain true to the languages themselves, without forcing them into
ill-fitting predetermined categories (Gil, 2001; Haspelmath, 2007, 2010a).”
A BIOLOGICAL BLUEPRINT VS.
CONVERGENT CULTURAL EVOLUTION
In various domains of study, similarities across different
phenomena may have quite different causes, and it may be
challenging to identify them. For example, biologists are not
sure whether the similarities between species in different taxa
(e.g., wings in birds and bats) can be exclusively explained by
convergent biological evolution. Alternatively, one might think
that many of the similarities are due to constraints on basic
structures that cannot be overridden by biological adaptation.
These do not seem to be currently well-understood, but at
least one biologist, Stephen Jay Gould (1941–2002) became
famous for suggesting that the power of convergent evolution has
been overestimated (Losos, 2017 provides some very accessible
recent discussion).
Similarly, the explanation for the similarities between
languages may not lie exclusively in convergent cultural
evolution. There may be specific biological constraints on
possible language systems, just as there are (apparently) specific
biological constraints on taste categories and emotion categories.
These are not currently well-understood by linguists (as noted
earlier), but they may well exist, just as there may be “constraints
on basic structures” in biology.
However, it should be self-evident that there are also many
similarities between languages that are sufficiently explained
by convergent cultural evolution. Just as nobody doubts that
the cross-cultural existence of similar kinds of houses, tools,
weapons, musical instruments and governance structures (e.g.,
chiefdoms) is not due to a genetic blueprint for culture but
to convergent cultural evolution, there is also no real doubt
that many similarities in the words of languages are due to
cultural similarities and need no biological explanation. For
example, many languages in the 21st century have short words
for mobile phones, and these can be created in different ways
(by abbreviating longer terms, e.g., Polish komórka from telefon
komórkowy, by using a brand name, e.g., Natel in earlier Swiss
German, or even letter abbreviations like HP in Indonesian,
for hand phone). Nobody would doubt the claim that this
is an adaptive feature of these languages that is not due to
anything in our biology.
It is an obvious feature of human linguisticality that human
groups form linguistic conventions that are subject to change.
The change is not fast, and speakers of the same community
usually find it easy to understand each other even across three
or four generations. But over the centuries, it accumulates, and
when cultural change is fast (as with mobile phones and many
other terms for modern technology), languages may change fast
to adapt to the speakers’ needs. Thus, languages are subject
to cultural evolution (Croft, 2000a; Mesoudi, 2011), and when
there are selective pressures, this change may be adaptive. Many
general aspects of languages are apparently due to the adaptation
of language structures to the needs of the speakers. Not only
the length of words can be explained as an adaptation to their
predictability and frequency (as in the mobile phone example;
cf. Zipf, 1935; Kanwal et al., 2017), but also the length and
presence of grammatical markers (see Haspelmath, 2020a on
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asymmetric coding in grammar). In phonological systems, not
only vowel dispersion, but also the structure of consonant
inventories is clearly adaptive (e.g., Flemming, 2017). And in
morphosyntax, not only asymmetric coding tendencies, but also
many word and clause ordering tendencies can be explained on
the basis of general processing preferences that are not specific
to linguisticality (Hawkins, 2014). Similarities across languages
in terms of word class categories (Croft, 2000b) and reflexive
constructions (Haspelmath, 2008) have likewise been explained
in functional-adaptive terms. Basically, all of the categories listed
in (4) above may well be similar across languages because they
serve universal needs of speakers.
Thus, linguists who compare languages and want to explain
patterns that are general across languages and cannot be due
to historical accidents need to consider two possible sources of
these similarities:
(i) convergent cultural evolution of languages to the same
needs of speakers,
(ii) constraints on biologically possible language systems:
innate building blocks (natural kinds) that provide a rigid
blueprint for languages.
The two answers might even be correct simultaneously, but
there is of course also a question of instrinsic likelihood: How
likely is it that a grammatical feature is part of an innate blueprint,
which would have had to evolve biologically within a million
years or less (“Darwin’s problem”)? By contrast, how likely it is
that an adaptive feature of a language system would have evolved
culturally over a few generations, given that we observe such
changes wherever we look in the historical record?
CONCLUSION: THE BUILDING BLOCKS
OF LANGUAGES UNDER A MIMIMALIST
LENS
If we take a comparative approach to human linguisticality,
we observe at the species level that linguisticality is unique to
humans. But at the level of different human communities, we
observe that each language is unique, just as other aspects of
human cultures are unique to each culture. Languages exhibit
many similarities, but just as biological similarities need not be
due to genetic identity, linguistic universals need not be due to an
innate blueprint. Analogously to biological convergent evolution,
which can produce similar outcomes in unrelated taxa (eyes
in insects and vertebrates), the similarities between languages
may be due to convergent cultural evolution. This means that
the description and comparison of languages does not lead to
immediate insights into human linguisticality (see (ii) in §6).
As noted, an alternative possibility is that some of the linguistic
universals are due to a biological blueprint [a “universal toolkit,”
as Jackendoff (2002: 75) calls it], and sometimes a biological
and a cultural-evolution explanation may be simultaneously
appropriate. Linguists have found it very difficult to decide
between these two possibilities, but a “minimalist lens” would
seem to suggest that as little as possible should be attributed to
biological constraints (i.e., to natural-kind categories). There are
some evident biological constraints in other parts of cognition, so
it cannot be ruled out that categories like “noun” and “verb,” or
“consonant” and “vowel,” or even “deep structure” and “surface
structure,” are innate building blocks of our cognition in the same
manner as the five basic tastes16.
But general principles of explanatory economy (cf. the “cost
scale” of explanatory factors in Haspelmath, 2019: 16) would
suggest that one should posit innate building blocks of languages
only if convergent-evolution explanations do not exist or are
very unlikely. As far as I can see, the evidence from comparative
linguistics does not currently provide strong evidence for
innate building blocks of grammars17. While my perspective is
shaped by the “functionalist” tradition of comparative linguistics
(Greenberg, 1963; Croft, 2003; Givón, 2010), this provides an
interesting convergence with some Chomskyan Minimalists such
as Hornstein (2018), who recognize that there may be far fewer
innate building blocks that than were often assumed in the past18.
Nevertheless, we need to pursue all avenues in order to come
to a better understanding of human languages and of human
linguisticality. I do not dismiss the natural-kinds program, and
linguists who pursue the natural-kinds program cannot dismiss
the successes of the convergent-evolution approach19.
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16Recall from section “Human Linguisticality, the ‘Language Faculty’ and
‘Universal Grammar”’ that the term “universal grammar” has not only been used
in the concrete sense of specific innate building blocks (which can be investigated
by a natural-kinds program as currently carried out by many syntacticians), but
also in the sense of “whatever is domain-specific to human linguisticality.” This
is not something that the comparative study of languages can contribute to, but
it seems quite likely that other considerations lead one to assume such domain-
specific capacities (e.g., in speech perception and word learning, as noted by Pinker
and Jackendoff, 2005: §3).
17This would also explain why the natural-kinds program (section “How
P-Linguistic Analyses May Illuminate Linguisticality: The Natural-Kinds
Program”) has not been very successful so far (as noted in section “The Structural
Uniqueness of the Building Blocks”).
18However, Hornstein makes a distinction between substantive and structural
universals (following Chomsky, 1965), and he is still quite optimistic about the
latter being innate [“the Subjacency Principle, Principles of Binding, Cross Over
effects, X’ theory with its heads, complements and specifiers; these are all structural
notions that describe (and delimit) how Gs function”]. But I do not think that
the phenomena described by these terms are any different from the asymmetric
coding, word-class and word order universals that have been successfully explained
in functional-adaptive terms by Croft, Hawkins, and Haspelmath.
19Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) say that it “seems likely” that constituent structure,
word order, agreement and case are specific to language and they simply assume
that they are biological. For some reason, they do not even consider the possibility
that the corresponding phenomena in languages are due to convergent cultural
evolution (even though short markers of semantic roles, as provided by case flags
and agreement markers, are just as useful for all speakers as short word for mobile
phones; see Lehmann, 1982 for a functional account of agreement phenomena).
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